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TABOO, TRANSGRESSION, AND 
LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION
Stefan Horlacher
Absolute freedom from taboos is a taboo as well, and not 
even a humane one
—Kaltenbrunner
[T]aboo, by carving out a part of the world, carves out a self
—Gell
Both temporally and geographically, the phenomena of taboo and 
transgression can be considered omnipresent, that is existent in all 
societies or cultures and at all times. 
If the ubiquity of taboos and their influence on social structures is 
generally accepted with regard to the past, which a narcissistic and 
supposedly enlightened present all too often views with condescen-
sion if not outright derision, what is remarkable is the fact that taboos 
not only continue to exist but that they can actually be said to be flour-
ishing. A brief reference to the recent debates on political correct-
ness, to shibboleths in relation to the terrorist attacks of  9/ 11, or to the 
ongoing question of how to deal with topics such as the Holocaust,1 
should suffice to make this point clear. Specifically with reference 
to the British literary scene, one could, of course, also mention the 
more than thirty years of censorship imposed on D.H. Lawrence’s 
novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover, the uproar surrounding the staging of 
Howard Brenton’s The Romans in Britain and Edward Bond’s Saved, 
or the outburst of violence following the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, so brilliantly portrayed in Hanif Kureishi’s 
novel The Black Album. Thus, even in modern or postmodern and 
Stefan180809_Ch01.indd 3 1/18/2010  12:30:33 PM
1
supposedly enlightened Western societies, taboos are still pervasive, 
the controversies just mentioned being only the tip of the iceberg of 
an ongoing cultural struggle with, against and in favor of taboos; a 
struggle which, as the above examples demonstrate, is especially well 
reflected, documented and hard fought in literature and the arts, and 
which ultimately can be traced back to the very origins of human-
kind. Wilhelm Wundt has called taboos “the oldest unwritten code 
of humanity” (Thody 312),2 Sigmund Freud takes parricide and the 
ensuing incest taboo as constitutive of society,3 and Philip Thody cor-
rectly concludes that “the impression given by most anthropologists is 
that the incest taboo is an even more important sign of our humanity 
than the development of language, the use of tools, or the obligation 
we feel to care for the old and the infirm” (37).4
Considering that taboos are remarkably ambiguous and multi-
 faceted phenomena, differing from period to period and from culture 
to culture, it is surprising that there has been no detailed, histori-
cally oriented and theoretically  up- t o- date study that analyses how 
British culture and literature in particular have dealt with this topic. 
It is for these reasons that Taboo and Transgression in British Literature 
undertakes to offer exemplary model analyses of representative pri-
mary texts. The approach adopted here traces the complex dynamic 
and ongoing negotiation of notions of taboo and transgression as an 
essential though often neglected facet to understanding the develop-
ment, production and conception of literature and literariness from 
the early modern Elizabethan period through to recent postmodern 
debates, covering almost fifty representative authors and œuvres. 
It is, of course, true that the concepts of taboo and transgression 
have for quite some time been the focus of a whole array of differ-
ent perspectives ranging from children’s and youth literature or fairy 
tales via sociology to cultural anthropology, philosophy, media stud-
ies, aesthetics, psychoanalysis and  psycho- linguistics. Moreover, 
many popular science books as well as dictionaries on the subject5 
bear witness to the still unbroken interest of a broad public in this 
interdisciplinary, not to say in several senses paradoxical topic of 
taboo; paradoxical because the concept of taboo has become a taboo 
in itself (cf. Thody 4), because taboo is generally accepted as draw-
ing the fundamental borders between the sacred and the profane, 
whereas a critical glance shows that these borders can scarcely be 
drawn unproblematically, since not only the concept of taboo as 
such, but also the concept of the sacred turns out to be polysemic, if 
not aporetic.6 While in most civilized societies the use of violence is 
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strongly tabooed, it nevertheless remains inherently if not inextrica-
bly bound up with the notion of taboo. This does not only hold true 
for the cultivating potential inherent to relinquishing drives, but, as 
Christoph Türcke argues, “above all for the fatuousness of a specific 
ban on thinking that individuals en masse subject themselves to in 
order to be able to endure a society they did not choose themselves 
and yet allow to remain as it is” (9).
Most commentators argue that there is no consensus any longer 
on what constitutes taboos today. As it came into common usage in 
Europe,  taboo— already in its original meaning not exactly a pre-
cise  term— has increased its semantic scope, while diminishing its 
terminological precision.7 However, given that seemingly unambig-
uous definitions of taboo mostly hinder rather than foster the pro-
duction of knowledge (cf. Eggert 19), an interdisciplinary approach 
encompassing cultural and literary studies, ethnology, anthropology, 
sociology, religious studies, and psychoanalysis does create a broad 
space for reflection necessary for the localization and analysis of 
phenomena and manifestations of taboo. The broad scope of disci-
plines involved in theorizing taboo arises from the fact that this con-
cept has proved central to understanding the formation of culture(s). 
Located at the culture / nature divide, taboos are on the level of the 
surface structure manifested differently depending on the society, 
cultural region, and time period, while on the deep structure they 
appear at least to a certain degree characterized by anthropological 
and psychoanalytical constants.
Let us, however, begin with some historical definitions and com-
mon usages of the term, before moving on to the theorization of 
taboo within and across a range of disciplines. The term taboo is of 
Polynesian origin and was first noted by Captain James Cook dur-
ing his exploration of Tonga in the late eighteenth century. “Not 
one of them would sit down, or eat a bit of any thing . . . ,” he notes 
in his Voyages to the Pacific, and continues: “On expressing my sur-
prize [sic] at this, they were all taboo, as they said; which word has a 
very comprehensive meaning; but, in general, signifies that a thing 
is forbidden. Why they were laid under such restraints, at pres-
ent, was not explained” (qtd. in “Taboo” 2009, [n. pag.]). In a fur-
ther entry, he writes: “As every thing would, very soon, be taboo, if 
any of our people, or of their own, should be found walking about, 
they would be knocked down with clubs” (ibid.). These two quotes 
from Cook’s journals already identify some of the problematic ele-
ments associated with modern definitions of the term, including 
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a comprehensiveness of meaning as “part of a community’s social 
codex” that extends beyond a mere prohibition on certain foods and 
the fact that over and  beyond— indeed in contrast  to— prohibitions 
or laws “[t]aboos are, per definition,  non- existing topics” that “can-
not be questioned as to their rational background” (Heinschink and 
Teichmann [n. pag.]; see also Thody 9).
Though there are a few examples of the term used in a transferred 
or figurative sense already in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the notion of taboo was generally restricted to religion, and the study 
of ‘primitive’ religions in particular. As Willard Gurdon Oxtoby 
notes, “two terms in particular came into wide use in the description 
of primitive religion: mana and tabu (‘taboo’),” with taboo, denot-
ing, “like ‘sacred’, that which is set apart from common use or con-
tact” (513). The emergent  late- Victorian discipline of anthropology, 
which in its early manifestations specialized in the study of foreign 
or alien,  non- European,  non- Christian cultures or religious tradi-
tions, brought the term taboo ‘within the pale’: “The anthropologi-
cal reflection on taboo starts with the  constatation . . .  as postulated 
by philosophical Christianity” of the radical dualism of body and 
soul, the physical and the metaphysical, which “can rarely be found 
beyond it or similarly minded thought systems” (Valeri 43). Thus, 
the two leading British theorists of taboo in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, Sir James Frazer and William Robertson Smith, argue that in 
 contra- distinction to European, Christian ‘advanced nations’ primi-
tive societies do
not distinguish between what pertains to the gods and what per-
tains to the world, between spiritual and physical evil, between 
the holy and the unclean or polluted: he [the savage] confuses them 
all under a single notion of ‘danger’, which corresponds to a single 
amoral  sentiment— fear. (ibid.)
Even if these definitions and distinctions belonging to the Age of 
Empire have subsequently been superseded, Frazer and Robertson 
Smith can nevertheless be seen as founding an “anthropological tra-
dition” that firmly connects taboo and the danger of  contagion / 
 pollution, the latter being “considered as an automatic reaction from 
the tabooed object or person” (ibid. 44).
Also writing at the turn of the last century, but from a sociological 
perspective that focuses on symbolic forms, Emile Durkheim states 
that “a taboo is a prohibition justified by the sacredness of what is 
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prohibited, and this sacredness, in turn, is embodied by ‘puissances 
redoutables’ ” (ibid.). For Durkheim rules such as the prohibition of 
incest “are too  fundamental to be enforced by human agency or by 
human agency alone.” Moreover, he also argues that “the sacred is 
the social in symbolic (i.e. reified) form” (ibid. 52). From this it fol-
lows that if the rules mentioned above “must be associated with 
forces that are as infallible and as unchallengeable as physical 
forces,” these forces in fact derive from society itself and symbol-
ize it. Durkheim’s and Alfred  Radcliffe- Brown’s view that taboo is 
essentially proscription, “the expression of a renunciatory or repres-
sive form of morality” (ibid. 58), is then taken up by Sigmund Freud, 
the issues of classification and renunciation / repression being closely 
intertwined, so that for the latter, in his “attempts to use his theory 
of the unconscious to account for the two aspects of taboo to which 
his predecessors attracted attention: ambivalence and contagion” 
(ibid.), taboo is defined as:
prohibitions of primaeval [sic] antiquity which were at some time 
externally imposed upon a generation of primitive men; they must, 
that is to say, no doubt have been impressed on them violently by the 
previous generation. These prohibitions must have concerned activ-
ities towards which there was a strong inclination. They must then 
have persisted from generation to generation, perhaps merely as a 
result of tradition transmitted through parental and social authority. 
(Freud 31)8
There are clear parallels between Freud’s and Durkheim’s theory: 
They both “identify taboo with renunciation; . . . view contagiousness 
as symbolic displacement” and “the ambivalence of what is tabooed 
as the reification of an ambivalent attitude toward it” (Valeri 59). 
But no matter whether taboo is linked to magic or morality, whether 
the psychoanalytical, sociological or anthropological dimension is 
more important, any comprehensive explanation must also take into 
account the classification of objects and the cosmological ideas that 
exist in particular societies. This insight prompted several ‘classifi-
catory’ or ‘taxonomic’ theories of taboo, amongst them the work of 
Edmund Leach and Mary Douglas. With Leach, the notion of taboo 
is considerably widened, so as “to include any kind of ‘prohibition, 
explicit and implicit, conscious and unconscious’ ” (ibid. 61). This 
allows him “to treat in the same analytic framework phenomena 
like aversion, disgust, judgements of inedibility or unmarriageability 
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(due to danger or a sense of propriety), and formal  prohibitions— in 
sum, the whole spectrum of socially shared avoidances” (ibid.). At 
the basis of Leach’s classificatory theory is a claim about cognition, 
which views taboo as the manifestation of a “kind of discriminatory 
 repression . . .  necessary to the functioning of conceptual thought.” 
Thus, taboo “serves to discriminate categories in men’s social uni-
verse,” and in so doing “reduces the ambiguities of reality to  clear- cut 
ideal types” (ibid. 63). As such, the function of taboo would be to 
repress “interstitial states produced by the application of discrete 
conceptual classes on the continuum of experience.” For Leach, the 
fact that these interstitial states “undermine the work of classifica-
tion by confusing adjacent categories” explains “their association 
with ‘sacredness,’ that is, with powers that are both contaminating 
and ambiguous.” If taboos are considered as rules for the avoidance 
of such powers, and if they induce mankind to avoid the sacred, they 
also “keep the destructive powers of confusion at bay and help main-
tain the unambiguous categorization that is a prerequisite of success-
ful communication” (ibid.).
A second classificatory approach was advanced by Mary Douglas. 
As the title of her analysis of taboo already suggests, for her the 
notion of pollution takes precedence over taboo. She combines 
 structural- functionalist elements—“follow[ing]  Radcliffe- Brown in 
considering pollution as a sanction, and thus as presupposing the 
taboo it sanctions” (ibid. 70)—with a more cognitive approach that 
“makes pollution primary but only by giving it some of the properties 
that taboo has in Leach.” Drawing on Lord Chesterfield’s definition 
of dirt as “matter out of place,” Douglas argues that objects are not 
considered dirty in and of themselves, but because of their status or 
classification in a system of categories. If in the most general formu-
lation her theory “states that pollution arises from what is residual 
in terms of any type of classification,” Valeri argues that “in prac-
tice her most novel and stimulating contribution lies in associating 
pollution with what is out of place in terms of one particular kind of 
 classification— namely taxonomy” (73). The basic issue on which the 
whole theory of pollution as taxonomic anomaly rests is whether it is 
“possible to show that everything polluting is taxonomically anoma-
lous and everything taxonomically anomalous is polluting” (ibid. 74). 
The problem here is that it has been shown that taboo is produced 
by a “normative classification by means of prototypes, rather than 
by a taxonomic impulse proper” (ibid. 78), and that the “exclusive 
linkage of taboo with categorical intermediacy or anomaly leaves 
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out precisely what epitomizes taboo in both popular and anthropo-
logical discourse: the taboos on incest and cannibalism” (ibid. 83).9 
This deficit in taxonomic theories of taboo gave rise to Françoise 
Héritier’s hypothesis that the “avoidance of the identical” is of prime 
importance, that is “the proscription of  associating— at least with 
regard to eating, reproducing, and having  sex— two terms that are in 
some crucial respect considered the same” (ibid.).10 If with Héritier 
“the principle of avoided identity” is still “the counterpart of a prin-
ciple of balance of contraries and thus of difference,” the avoidance 
of identity becomes even more primary in the work of Alain Testard, 
for whom “taboo is concerned solely with disjoining a substance from 
itself, and thus with creating difference where lack of difference is 
implied” (ibid. 86; cf. Testard 1985 and 1991):
Testard’s theory of taboo, and more generally of symbolic efficacy, 
seems completely at odds with the usual structuralist and function-
alist theories, particularly those of Leach and Douglas. While they 
stress the preservation of difference, he stresses its creation from 
the negation of identity. Their presuppositions are dualistic, his are 
monistic. Identity is for them secondary, for it presupposes a system 
of differences, but for him the opposite is true: identity is primary 
and difference is derivative. (ibid. 91)
More  subject- and  body- oriented theories on taboo have been for-
mulated by Alfred Gell, Anne Meigs, Julia Kristeva and Valerio 
Valeri himself. Gell, for whom “taboo does not signal a self that 
preexists it” but is “a form of existence of the self” (ibid. 97), 
develops a theory that takes “taboo’s role in creating a sense of 
personal identity and agency” into account. Arguing that taboo 
not only expresses but constitutes the self and that “personal 
identity consists in a difference from other humans which coin-
cides with a difference in their relationship with the world” (ibid. 
98), he maintains that “taboo, by carving out a part of the world, 
carves out a self.” Such a  self— and this is where Gell’s theory has 
its  shortcomings— must also, however, be located in a body, given 
that the relations between object and subject regulated by taboo 
are principally “eating, touching, and penetrating, as in killing 
and having sex” (ibid. 101). “All these,” Valeri points out, “involve 
the body as desiring, that is as feeding on its objects, consuming 
them,” so that it seems necessary to stress the “crucial element of 
corporeality inherent in taboo” (ibid.). Both Anna Meigs and Julia 
Kristeva have subsequently  re- emphasized the  body- centeredness 
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of the notion of pollution, and it is the latter in particular who 
has not only injected “a subjective and developmental dimension 
into the exclusively classificatory perspective of structuralism,” 
but also shown how a
subject symbolically constituted, but necessarily located in the body, 
must be haunted by the fear of its disintegration through the body, 
since it constantly experiences the body’s resistance to the subject’s 
symbolic ordering of itself. The embodied subject’s fear of disinte-
gration through the body and by the body is the ultimate basis for the 
notion of pollution. (ibid. 111)
From this perspective, pollution and abjection coincide as “the 
cultural form taken by what threatens the subject because it has 
to do with its precultural  stage— that it is the presymbolic mak-
ing itself felt in the symbolic” (ibid. 110).11 Working within this 
framework, and developing upon as well as combining both Freud’s 
critique of religion and Douglas’s taxonomy of the biblical system 
of food taboos, Kristeva postulates a  three- stage trajectory of pol-
lution that is premised on increasing levels of abstraction moving 
from the primitive, via Mosaic and Levitican laws, to Christianity, 
where “the Christian notion of sin substitutes the Levitican notion 
of pollution” (ibid. 107): Whereas “Judaism externalises abjec-
tion, Christianity internalizes it” (ibid.). Kristeva thus reads the 
history of morality as “that of a progressive reinforcement of the 
‘male’ principle of symbolic differentiation and order as against 
the ‘female’ principle of indifferentiation” (ibid. 106). More specif-
ically, what has taken place in the shift from the Old Testament 
to the New with regard to pollution is a “reversal of the source of 
danger, from outside to inside, [which] correlates with a transfor-
mation of  orality” (ibid.).12
Valeri, whose interdisciplinary approach eschews the usual dis-
tinction between anthropological and psychoanalytical approaches 
to the topic, argues “that the phenomenon of taboo and the various 
dangers that motivate it must be apprehended at the points of articu-
lation and confrontation of the subject and the  conditions— symbolic 
and  presymbolic— of its existence” (111). For him, the “greater the 
embodiment of the subject, . . . the greater its potential permeabil-
ity to external bodies,” and the greater, also, “the potential that any 
material undermining of the body (diseases, etc.) be interpreted as 
the undermining of the subject.” From this it follows that potentially 
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“any disease can be read as a pollution, and any pollution can turn 
into a disease” (ibid. 111f.). Thus,
[t]he focus of the language of taboo and ‘pollution’ on the body as
carrier of a subject that is constituted by symbolic classifications
should be made evident by the concern of the symbolic classifica-
tion with food, excretions, and the processes of transformation and
decay of the body that are principally associated with taboo and pol-
lution. A taboo usually marks some event or situation that is likely to
threaten the integrity of the body as the seat of the integrity of the
subject.  But . . .  this integrity of the subject may in turn depend on the 
integrity of a certain external object, as determined by the classifi-
catory system at large. If the focus of interest of taboo, then, is ulti-
mately the subject, it does not  exclude— indeed, it must  include— all
classifications of objects that have any bearing on the subject. . . . Thus 
pollution, although focussed on the subject, modelled on the body’s
permeability to external objects, and principally concerned with
the substances and processes where this permeability is located,
may stray very far from them. It  may . . .  become entangled with all
kinds of medical and magical theories and practices where they exist. 
Furthermore, it may be used to enforce rules, to shore up or even
express hierarchical relations, and so on. (ibid. 112)
If this survey has at least given a glimpse of the different approaches 
to taboo ranging from traditional British cultural or social anthro-
pology, via continental European sociology, structuralism and psy-
choanalysis, to  post- structuralism, and if it has become apparent 
that these approaches are often hardly compatible in that they 
emphasize entirely different aspects, it  seems— even at the risk of 
an  oversimplification— necessary to offer at least something like a 
generally accepted working definition of taboo which the follow-
ing literary analyses can take as a starting point and from which 
they can diverge into more specialized Durkheimian, Freudian, 
Kristevan, or Valerian directions and approaches. To produce 
this kind of general guideline or smallest common denominator 
of taboo and to propose a  non- specialized definition, a combina-
tion of the respective entries of the Encyclopædia Britannica and the 
Oxford English Dictionary Online proved helpful. In both cases, a 
shift in the meaning and use of the term can be viewed as a produc-
tive instance of the ‘margins rewriting the center’ and as a measure 
of the impact that  post- colonial discourses have had after Edward 
Said’s seminal Orientalism in redefining the field of anthropology. 
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Thus, whereas the original 1888 articles on taboo and totemism by 
Sir James Frazer for the Encyclopædia Britannica “laid the founda-
tion for his work on primitive religion” (Cannon [n. pag.], empha-
sis added), the recent entry defines taboo more universally as “the 
prohibition of an action or the use of an object based on ritualistic 
distinctions of them either as being sacred and consecrated or as 
being dangerous, unclean, and accursed” (“Taboo” 2006, [n. pag.]). 
While this entry still stresses that taboos “were most highly devel-
oped in the Polynesian societies of the South Pacific” (ibid.), it also 
makes clear that “they have been present in virtually all cultures” 
(ibid.) and that there is an
inconsistency between the taboos in which notions of sacredness or 
holiness are  apparent . . .  and taboos in which notions of uncleanli-
ness were the motivating factor . . . . Generally, the prohibition that 
is inherent in a taboo includes the idea that a breach or defiance of 
the taboo will automatically be followed by some kind of trouble to 
the offender . . . . These misfortunes would ordinarily be regarded as 
accidents or bad luck, but to believers in taboos they are regarded 
as punishments for breaking some taboo. A person meets with an 
accident or has no success in a given pursuit, and, in seeking for 
its cause, he or others infer that he has in some manner commit-
ted a breach of taboo. . . . There is no generally accepted explanation 
of taboos, but there is broad agreement that the taboos current in 
any society tend to relate to objects and actions that are significant 
for the social order and that belong to the general system of social 
 control. (ibid.)13
Slightly different aspects are emphasized in the entry in the Oxford 
English Dictionary Online, where the meaning of taboo is defined as
[t]he putting of a person or thing under prohibition or interdict, per-
petual or temporary; the fact or condition of being so placed; the pro-
hibition or interdict itself. Also, the institution or practice by which
such prohibitions are recognized and enforced. . . . The institution
is generally supposed to have had a religious or superstitious origin
(certain things being considered the property of the gods or super-
human powers, and therefore forbidden to men), and to have been
extended to political and social affairs, being usually controlled by
the king or great chiefs in conjunction with the priests. Some things,
acts, and words were permanently taboo or interdicted to the mass of 
the people, and others specially to women, while a temporary taboo
was frequently imposed, often apparently quite arbitrarily.
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Taking the survey of theoretical approaches to taboo as well as 
the definitions offered above as their background, the task of the 
articles collected in this book is to analyze the complex dynamic of 
intrinsic (textual) and extrinsic (contextual) transformations inher-
ent to notions of taboo and transgression as these have developed 
and are represented in British literature from the Elizabethan period 
through to the present. As noted above, the  concept— or even “idiom” 
(Valeri 113)—of taboo is here not understood in a narrow sense but 
rather viewed as comprising persons as well as locations, nutrition, 
the pronouncing of names (e.g., relatives) and certain actions, cul-
tural practices and conditions (such as those regarding the dead). 
Moreover, the analyses will consider what functions taboos fulfill in 
British society at different points in time, bearing in mind that, on 
the one hand, taboos can be functionalized by a society to strengthen 
its identity (cf. the scapegoat), that they can create security since they 
exclude objects, actions and persons viewed as threatening and thus 
produce, albeit ex negativo, a legal sphere in which certain topics are 
precluded from being openly discussed, but that, on the other hand, 
this function can also be interpreted as a highly effective means of 
social control, that is as a collective system of repression and negative 
conventions that draw borders and help secure authority along the 
temporally and culturally specific axes of the sacred and the profane, 
the pure and the impure. Since the inherent transgressive potential 
and the sanctions applied for trespassing taboos provide an insight 
into the  socio- psychological condition of a society and culture, the 
interdependent, overlapping discourses surrounding the concept of 
 taboo— such as transgression and repression, innovation and conser-
vatism, punishment and pleasure, or sadism and masochism, to name 
but a  few— can be understood as an arena of contestation in which a 
society negotiates not only its values and beliefs (from the Inquisition 
via  post- Enlightenment secularization to sexual liberation) but also 
its borders and power structures.
Especially as far as Western or  so- called permissive, ‘enlightened’ 
or  taboo- free societies are concerned, one has to ask whether this 
supposed liberation from taboos is not also a disguised, deferred 
and disavowed discursive structure of repression which excludes the 
abject in the form of impotency, incontinence, incest, cannibalism, 
insanity, implicit racism, old age and death. If as some critics argue 
we live in an age that prides itself “in its aversion towards taboos 
and in which ever more taboos are losing their erstwhile power” pre-
cisely because they are regarded as “inhuman, repressive, irrational 
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and archaic” (Kaltenbrunner 7), there is also “much to indicate that 
under the guise of an emancipatory and critically enlightened ratio-
nal thinking new taboos have been created that are no less repressive 
than their predecessors” (ibid. 9). In this sense, maybe “the censor 
of old” has merely been “replaced by an authority that operates by 
methods that are more diffuse and subtle, in part because we have 
ourselves internalized them” (ibid.), and thus behind our total aver-
sion to taboos there continue to operate coercive mechanisms that 
have yet to be revealed. In any event, the exploration of the para-
doxical and polysemic potential of taboos does give rise to the fol-
lowing issues: whether taboos will remain a necessary constituent of 
human society in the future, in how far their transgression automat-
ically generates new taboos, and whether or not they can be viewed 
as producing knowledge and furthering progress. As a matter of fact, 
taboos need not always “be characterized by irrational or repressive 
qualities; they can equally well have a ‘nurturing  function’ . . . , that 
is to say have a life conserving or enhancing role, which is also there-
fore rational if we accept Alfred North Whitehead’s definition that 
the inherent function of reason is ‘to promote the art of life’ ” (ibid. 
14f.). Moreover, as Kaltenbrunner contends: “[the] complete removal 
of taboos would destroy the fabric of human society. One taboo can 
be replaced by another, even the conversion of taboos from negative 
into positive ones (or vice versa) is possible, but taboos cannot be 
eliminated from people’s lives.” (16) This is, of course, reminiscent 
of Alexander Mitscherlich’s line of reasoning when he calls those 
who would merely negate taboos fools who have not yet learned 
what fear means and understand nothing of the world. Especially 
from the perspective of psychoanalysis, “the utopia of a  taboo- free 
society” is often considered as compromised by the fact that it was 
conceived by people with drives for which there are no predeter-
mined limits regarding their satisfaction (cf. ibid. 15). It is in this 
sense that Thody argues that taboos “embody something of the 
principle of deferred gratification which Freud sees as the first step 
towards the process of civilization. They thus represent a practice 
which any culture rejects completely only at its peril” (307). From 
this it follows that taboos can be understood “as a means whereby 
society tries to hold itself together against internal decay as well as 
external threats” (ibid. 304), and that, although taboos are irrational 
“in so far as they never allow themselves to be reduced to mere means 
for determinate ends, it is hard to deny them ‘a deeper  rationality’ ” 
(Kaltenbrunner 12).
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Since taboos are normally perceived of as having an emotive compo-
nent, their transgression not only creates tensions and triggers mech-
anisms of exclusion or punishment, they can also be a catalyst for a 
controlled release of  pent- up aggressions and libidinal energies as is the 
case with jokes (cf. Horlacher 2009, 17–47) or swear words (cf. Eggert and 
Golec 9). From this perspective, it is evident that the  pleasure- inducing 
dimension involved in transgressing taboos has to be taken into con-
sideration  too— as does the problematic and ambivalent ‘nature’ of 
transgression itself. As Chris Jenks has emphasized, to “transgress is to 
go beyond the bounds or limits set by a commandment or law or con-
vention, it is to violate or infringe. But to transgress is also more than 
this, it is to announce and even laudate [sic] the commandment, the law 
or the convention.” Thus, transgression becomes “a deeply reflexive 
act of denial and affirmation” (2). But if it is defined as “that conduct 
which breaks rules or exceeds boundaries,” what then “is the character 
of the cultures that provide for the appreciation or receptability of such 
behaviour?” (Ibid. 3) Is transgression, as some theorists would have it, 
central to postmodernity, is it the hallmark of an aesthetic of the mod-
ern, or is it an integral part of our history of laws, the symbolic order 
and taboos? Does transgressive behavior deny limits and boundaries or 
does it exceed and thus complete them? And doesn’t every rule, limit, 
boundary or edge carry with it its own fracture, penetration or impulse 
to disobey? If transgression and excess thus become an important com-
ponent of the rule, they would neither be “an abhorration nor a luxury” 
but rather “dynamic forces in cultural reproduction preventing stagna-
tion by breaking the rule while simultaneously ensuring stability by 
reaffirming the rule” (ibid. 7). As John Jervis succinctly argues:
The transgressive is reflexive, questioning both its own role and 
that of the culture that has defined it in its otherness. It is not sim-
ply a reversal, a mechanical inversion of an existing order it opposes. 
Transgression, unlike opposition or reversal, involves hybridization, 
the mixing of categories and the questioning of the boundaries that 
separate categories. It is not, in itself, subversion; it is not an overt 
and deliberate challenge to the status quo. What it does do, though, 
is implicitly interrogate the law, pointing not just to the specific, and 
frequently arbitrary, mechanisms of power on which it  rests— despite 
its universalizing  pretensions— but also to its complicity, its involve-
ment in what it prohibits. (4)
Literature, of course, can also be understood as a phenomenon of 
transgression which is characterized by the fact that while literary 
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texts bear a clear historical imprint, they nevertheless transcend any 
narrow notion of mimesis which would reduce them to a mirror or 
straightforward representation of their ‘given’ reality. Since taboos are 
normally not the topic of open discussions but largely internalized, any 
form of critical questioning is realized, if at all, only through massive 
outside influence. Given literature’s ability to constitute a discursive 
field in which even marginalized, aberrant voices can articulate them-
selves, to give voice to something which could be called ‘the collective 
unconscious’ and to transcend its time of origin (cf. Horlacher 2004, 
291–329), literature becomes an extraordinarily privileged medium for 
the depiction and analysis of phenomena such as taboo and transgres-
sion.14 And the more so if one considers literature with Kristeva as “the 
ultimate coding of our crises, of our most intimate and most serious 
apocalypses” (208) and as “an elaboration, a discharge, and a hollow-
ing out of abjection through the Crisis of the Word” (ibid.). However, 
if the transgressing of  prohibitions— a transgressing of which litera-
ture is also  part— is not the exception but a constitutive element of the 
taboo or prohibition, this means that transgression is always already 
codified (cf. Bataille 63ff.). Very often there exist exact definitions of 
when and by whom transgressive acts are allowed, one example being 
killing during a war.15 Since taboos have to be communicated publicly 
in order to function— “The taboo is always linked to a collective pub-
lic. There are no taboos that are not public.” (Eggert 21)—the ambiva-
lence between inclusion, exclusion and transgression engenders an 
ambivalence concerning the representation of taboos. These phenom-
ena of prohibitions (such as aniconism) and precepts regarding repre-
sentation (e.g., of the naked human body) have the effect that across 
the arts as well as throughout history “ritualized representations and 
symbolizations have been constitutive for taboos,” that is to say, that 
“taboos reveal a genuinely aesthetic component which extends from 
 non- linguistic symbolizations through to the standardization of aes-
thetics” (ibid. 22). From this in turn it follows that an approach that 
conceives of taboos only as social phenomena misses the point, that 
textual analyses need to pay attention to the strategies and the con-
tents of symbolizations, and that aesthetic traditions need to be taken 
into consideration, such as, to give but one example, the modernist 
aesthetic of innovation which often depends on rupture and on violat-
ing taboos. Moreover, inherent to the topic of taboo and transgres-
sion is that it raises fundamental questions regarding the limits of art, 
its  self- conception and its aesthetics based on power: “What is art 
allowed to do?—Is art allowed to do anything?” (Ibid.)
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Given the specific qualities of literary texts as discussed above 
and their careful selection in this volume, the plays, novels and 
poems analyzed should make it possible to provide a comprehensive 
survey of some of the most important developments in Britain’s aes-
thetic, religious, economic and political systems of values as these are 
represented in and negotiated through literature. The literary texts 
selected are characterized by their contemporary as well as by their 
historic relevance and cultural influence, so that changes and altera-
tions in the epistemological, ideological, and discursive systems as 
well as in the literary techniques and aesthetics applied can be shown 
on a larger diachronic scale. Although aspects from Cultural Studies, 
New Historicism as well as functional approaches are taken into con-
sideration, the focus is primarily within literary, not cultural stud-
ies. This manner of proceeding makes it possible to undertake close 
readings of major  texts— ranging from the works of Shakespeare 
via Milton and Bunyan to Joyce and  McEwan— with a view to the 
larger synchronic as well as diachronic patterns of thought they are 
part of and helped to shape,  and— in a second  step— to link these to 
the  extra- literary world. For this reason, the ten literary analyses 
are introduced and contextualized with the help of two diachronic 
survey articles. The first examines the changing legal framework as 
well as the concomitant transformation of social norms and explores 
their interaction with the collective imaginary as exemplified by lit-
erature. Given the longevity of censorship in the United Kingdom, 
that is, the tabooing of certain literary texts, the second survey arti-
cle concentrates on literary strategies for subverting or transgressing 
taboos, considering as well the fact that the institution or field of 
literature has in the past operated, and continues to, with its own 
specific taboo structures.16
Notes
I would like to thank Claudia Lainka, M.A., for her precious help in format-
ting and proofing of the manuscript, and Peter Stear, M.A., for preliminary 
research and help with translations and stylistic issues.
Cf. the debate around Dani Levy’s Hitler comedy 1. Mein Führer—Die 
wirklich wahrste Wahrheit über Adolf Hitler, which was released in 
German cinemas in early 2007.
Cf. also: “In so far as they predate the invention not only of religion but 2.
also of laws and philosophical speculation, they are indeed a relict of a 
 pre- ethical stage in the evolution of human thought” (Thody 312).
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Cf. Freud 156: “[T]he beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art 3. 
meet in the Oedipus complex.”
Cf. also Edmund Leach, who has called the incest taboo “the great4.
event with which culture began,” and Claude  Lévi- Strauss, who sees
it as “the corner stone of human society” (Thody 37).
Cf., for example, Thody; Hoffmann; Graupmann; Holden; McDonald.5. 
“Though the fundamental borderline between the sacred and the6.
profane in defining taboo varies across cultures and epochs, even
apparent borders have proved themselves paradoxical, or rather
ambiguous. The word sacred derives from the Latin sacer, which
denotes both what is holy and heinous, whereas profane denotes that
which lies outside the fanum or sanctuary, has not been consecrated,
and hence can also mean the everyday or quotidian. Sacer means both
consecrated and execrated, what is both revered and repellent, and
has therefore the same inherent numinous ambiguity as the origi-
nally Polynesian word tabu” (Kaltenbrunner 8). All translations from
German texts are by Peter Stear, M.A.
“The uncertain etymology and origin, as well as the even more7.
indeterminate meaning brought about through translations and
 circulation— ranging from ‘consecrated’ to ‘sacrosanct’, from ‘invio-
lable’ to ‘forbidden’—have helped rather than hindered the dissemi-
nation of the word in Europe. Besides this, and the attraction of the 
exotic, one also however needs to consider the productive vacuum
of an actual lexical gap. For the  anti- norm or prohibition, deter-
mined by religious veneration as well as fear, by experiences under-
gone as well as political intentions, by the replacement of instincts
lost by new bonds, for all of these there was no single word in the
language, no ‘obvious marker’. Taboo filled that gap, has been fur-
ther ‘secularized’ in its meaning, reduced down to what is embar-
rassing and objectionable, with the latter also eventually becoming
taboo” (Betz 141).
Cf. also Freud 34f.: “I will now sum up the respects in which light8.
has been thrown on the nature of taboo by comparing it with the
obsessional prohibitions of neurotics. Taboo is a primaeval prohibi-
tion forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside, and directed
against the most powerful longings to which human beings are sub-
ject. The desire to violate it persists in their unconscious; those who
obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo pro-
hibits. The magical power that is attributed to taboo is based on the
capacity for arousing temptation; and it acts like a contagion because
examples are contagious and because the prohibited desire in the
unconscious shifts from one thing to another. The fact that the viola-
tion of a taboo can be atoned for by a renunciation shows that renun-
ciation lies at the basis of obedience to taboo.”
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For reasons of space, Claude  Lévi- Strauss’s important work on 9. 
 totemism and his basic thesis that “taboo creates a ‘signification’ 
which is reduced to the creation of a social difference, or rather a dif-
ference of social units” (Valeri 95) can only be mentioned in passing.
Françoise Héritier argues “that taboos maintain the balance of the10.
world by proscribing the reinforcement of either of two contraries
which is brought about by the summation of two or more identical
(or equivalent) terms. . . . The taboo on incest belongs to the same
logic: in order to reproduce certain relationships of contrariety in
the social world, it proscribes the marital and even sexual associa-
tion of people who are categorically identical” (Valeri 84).
Cf. ibid. 105: Ritual pollution “happens when the ‘paternal’ symbolic 11.
order does not sufficiently repress the ‘maternal’ semiotic order,
when a subject that is the function of language does not completely
displace a presubject that exists in the instability of the semiotic dif-
ferentiation of the body.” In Kristeva’s interpretation, the phenom-
enon amounts to “a transposition into the realm of the symbolic of
the borderline separating ‘the territory of the body from the signify-
ing chain’ ” (ibid.), which she terms “abjection: a loss of the symboli-
cally, linguistically founded subject, a fall into its presymbolic stage,
where the subject becomes lost in the object instead of constituting
itself by standing against the object” (ibid. 106).
Cf. also: “Levitican orality is linked with eating; Christian orality is12.
linked with speaking” (ibid. 106).
What we should add to these definitions is that typically, and13. 
 cross- culturally, taboo appears to be primarily concerned with “the
body in its exchanges with other bodies,” such as decomposing,
excreting, bleeding, reproducing, eating, and to define “basic social
rules involved in those bodily exchanges or symbolized by them (for
instance, the taboos on murder and incest, both of which are usually 
symbolized by a polluting flow of blood). Taboo also seems to be
involved in the avoidance of sacrilege, that is, of improper relations
with divinities and their appurtenances” (ibid. 48).
Literary texts are understood as being a central part of that “larger14.
symbolic order by which a culture imagines its relation to the con-
ditions of its existence” (Matus 5) and as a space “in which shared
anxieties and tensions are articulated and symbolically addressed”
(ibid. 7). Moreover, through active reader participation, literature
renders imagination ‘livable’—the fictional world can actually be
experienced and can therefore be ‘tested’ and  criticized— so that
the literary text becomes a privileged space of simulation where the
work on a cultural imaginary can take place (cf. Fluck).
Hence the ‘heinous’ act ascribed to the events of  9/ 11 as referenced15.
above, the concomitant echoes of Pearl Harbor, the subsequent
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need to invoke a ‘war on terror’, and the categorical indistinctness 
in international law when dealing with asymmetrical warfare and 
failed states.
This is exemplified by the act of canonizing certain texts or genres, 16. 
which may then invite acts of transgression, thereby allowing litera-
ture to retain its critical edge and to renew itself continually.
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